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Foreword: President Truman and the Steel Seizure
Case: A Symposium
Ken Gormley*
In April of 1952, during the stressful days of the Korean War,
President Harry S. Truman made a decision that would haunt his
Presidency. With the steel industry and Steelworkers Union at an
impasse in negotiations, and a strike by 600,000 workers looming
that Truman feared would cripple production of weapons and en-
danger American troops overseas, the President ordered his Secre-
tary of Commerce, Charles Sawyer, to seize the nation's steel mills
and to keep them running.' "Our national security and our
chances of peace depend on our defense production," Truman an-
nounced grimly at a nationally televised address on April 8th.
"And our defense production depends on steel."'
For Truman, the action was both necessary and dictated by no-
tions of fairness. Steelworkers had not received a wage increase
since 1950. Their contracts had expired at the end of 1951, and
after rancorous negotiations between labor and management, the
* Ken Gormley, a Professor at Duquesne University School of Law specializing in
constitutional subjects, served as the organizer and moderator of the Steel Seizure pro-
gram. Gormley is a past recipient of a Research Fellowship from the Truman Library and
Institute, relating to his work on the "Archibald Cox: Conscience of a Nation" (Perseus
Books, 1997). (Among other excursions into public service, Cox served briefly as Chairman
of the Wage Stabilization Board during the Truman Administration). Gormley became
interested in the controversial Steel Seizure Case during his work at the Truman Library
in Independence, Missouri.
Portions of this Foreword are adapted from a speech that Professor Gormley deliv-
ered at the Chautauqua Institution in Chautauqua, New York on June 25, 2003, "President
Truman and the Steel Seizure Case: Haunting Parallels to Today "s War on Terrorism?" as
well as from an article he authored for Whistle Stop, a publication of the Harry S. Truman
Library Institute (Summer, 2003) entitled: "Nerves of Steel: Truman vs. The Supreme
Court."
1. For two of the best accounts of the events leading up to the Steel Seizure Case, as
well as the subsequent battle in the courts, see MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL
SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1994)); ALAN F. WESTIN, THE
ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE: YOUNGSTOWN SHEET AND TUBE CO. V. SAWYER
(1958); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT at Ch. 8 (2d ed. 2001).
2. Videotape of President Truman press conference (hereinafter "Videotape of press
conference"), April 8, 1952, courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library & Institute.
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Wage Stabilization Board had become involved in March of 1952
to break the deadlock.3 That Board had been created by President
Truman to regulate wages and prices in key industries during the
Korean War, to keep the economy from spiraling out of control. It
had waded into the steel controversy and recommended a 26-cent-
per-hour increase in wages, and a countervailing price increase of
$4.75 per ton. Yet the steel companies expressed outrage - they
insisted that they would need a price increase of at least $12 per
ton to justify hiking wages that high.4 Consequently, the steel
companies snubbed the Wage Stabilization Board's recommenda-
tion, causing the nation's steelworkers to announce that they
would commence a strike at midnight on April 9th.'
President Truman, at the time he decided to take action, was
certainly sympathetic with the steelworkers. United Steelworkers
President Philip Murray had already kept his men from striking
for months, at the President's request, in an effort to allow the
Wage Stabilization Board to resolve the matter.6 As Truman
walked into his impromptu press conference in a dark suit, his
spectacles firmly affixed to his face, he stared into the camera and
minced no words. Of the steel companies' demand for a $12-per-
ton price increase he declared: "Now that's the most outrageous
thing I've ever heard of. They not only want to raise their prices
to cover any wage increase, they want to double their money on
the deal."7
With the war in Korea going on, and memories of World War II
still fresh, Truman considered it plain un-American that the
"profiteering" steel companies provoke such an impasse.8 At 10:30
p.m., just hours before the scheduled strike, Truman signed Ex-
ecutive Order No. 10340, authorizing the federal government to
take over the mills, an action that would forever impact the
American Presidency.
The response to Truman's edict, other than from organized la-
bor, was swift and negative. The Chicago Daily News called Tru-
3. REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 155.
4. ALONZO L. HAMBY, MAN OF THE PEOPLE: A LIFE OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 594 (1995).
5. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952).
6. SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS (hereinafter "PROCEEDINGS") at 708 (comments of Maeva
Marcus).
7. Film, "A President's Power Contested: The Steel Seizure Case," narrated by Rich-
ard E. Neustadt, McGraw-Hill Text-Films, (circa 1953) courtesy of the Harry S. Truman
Library & Institute; WESTIN, supra note 2, at 15.
8. Id.
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man's decision "leaping socialism."9 The New York Daily News
said, "Hitler and Mussolini would have loved this."" The Wash-
ington Post wrote, "President Truman's seizure of the steel indus-
try will probably go down in history as one of the most high-
handed acts committed by an American President.""
Clarence Randall, President of Inland Steel Company, broadcast
a nationwide radio and television rebuttal to President Truman's
press conference, the following day, on behalf of the steel industry.
He stated:
Happily, we still live in a country where a private citizen may
look the President in the eye and tell him that he was wrong,
but actually it is not the President of the United States to
whom I make answer. It is Harry S. Truman, the man, who
last night so far transgressed his oath of office, so far abused
the power which is temporarily his, that he must now stand
and take it."
The White House, history reveals, never expected that this
would turn into a Constitutional show-down in the courts. Al-
though legal advisors like Milton Kayle warned Truman of possi-
ble danger if he ventured down the path of seizing privately-
owned mills, these same advisors believed the odds were low that
the judicial branch would actually touch such a political hot-
potato. Indeed, Truman's actual plan was to seize the steel mills,
force the steel companies and labor to sit down at the bargaining
table again, and muscle them into a compromise."
What the White House had not counted on was the decision of
United States District Judge David Pine, a relatively obscure fed-
eral trial judge in Washington, D.C., who had been assigned the
case. To the shock of everyone including the steel companies' own
lawyers, Judge declared President Truman's actions unconstitu-
tional, finding that there was "utter and complete lack of authori-
tative support" for the President's seizure of privately owned busi-
9. Leaping Socialism, CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, April 9, 1952 (courtesy of Harry S. Tru-
man Library).
10. Truman Does a Hitler, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, April 10, 1952 (courtesy of Truman
Library).
11. Without Benefit of Law, WASHINGTON POST, April 10, 1952 (courtesy of Truman
Library).
12. Film, "A President's Power Contested: The Steel Seizure Case," narrated by Rich-
ard E. Neustadt, McGraw-Hill Text-Films, (circa 1953) courtesy of the Harry S. Truman
Library & Institute. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 18.
13. PROCEEDINGS at 688-690.
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nesses. 14 Judge Pine's decision, with one stroke, propelled the case
out of the political arena and into the appellate courts. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, issued a stay
of Judge Pine's ruling until the matter could be taken up by the
Supreme Court. 5 The United States Supreme Court quickly
granted certiorari and held expedited arguments, declaring that
the President had exceeded his powers under the Constitution.
16
The definitive 6-3 decision in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Com-
pany v. Sawyer served as a stern rebuke of Truman, during a pe-
riod of already-dwindling popularity. More importantly, the
Youngstown case established limits on the scope of Presidential
power that are still relevani today.
To mark the golden anniversary of this historic case, Duquesne
University School of Law in conjunction with the Truman Presi-
dential Museum and Library in Independence, Missouri, hosted a
special symposium in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on November 22,
2002. This extraordinary event brought together a panel of Tru-
man advisors, historians, lawyers and constitutional scholars to
consider President Truman's controversial decision through the
lens of history.
The distinguished panelists included Milton Kayle and Ken
Hechler, former Special Assistants in the Truman White House;
Professor David E. Feller, who served as Assistant General Coun-
sel to the United Steelworkers of America in 1952, working closely
with Arthur Goldberg (later Justice of the Supreme Court) in writ-
ing principal briefs for the Steelworkers; Stanley L. Temko, then a
young lawyer at Covington & Burling in Washington, D.C., who
filed the certiorari petition to the Supreme Court on behalf of U.S.
Steel Corporation; Dr. Maeva Marcus, a Supreme Court historian
and author of the definitive book "Truman and the Steel Seizure
Case"; and Professor John Q. Barrett, a law professor at St. John's
University, one of the nation's leading experts on Justice Robert
Jackson. Former U.S. Court of Appeals Judge and White House
Counsel Abner Mikva, who clerked for Justice Sherman Minton at
the time, participated via written comments.
An overflow crowd of nearly 600 lawyers, judges, historians,
academicians, students, union leaders, steel industry officials, and
interested citizens attended the event, at which Dr. Michael De-
14. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 70.
15. Id. at 85.
16. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952).
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vine, President of the Harry S. Truman Library, and Clifton Tru-
man Daniel, the President's grandson and member of the Truman
Library & Institute's Board of Directors, participated as special
guests.
In an extraordinary filmed introduction, Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist, who had clerked for Justice Jackson at the time of
the Steel Seizure Case, set the scene: 7 As a young 27-year-old law
clerk new to Washington, he recalled that the Steel Seizure Case
was viewed as a potential Constitutional landmark from the start.
In an informal straw poll, the Justices' clerks were split as to how
they guessed their bosses would resolve the case once it arrived in
the Supreme Court. Yet there was little doubt that it would have
a dramatic impact on scope of Presidential power in the United
States. Recalled Rehnquist, the case was "front page news" from
the start.18
What prompted President Truman to decide to seize the steel
mills? Was it simply, as some historians have suggested, a result
of bad advice from his White House advisors?
Milton Kayle, who gathered information on the steel contro-
versy for the President, unearthed a memo that he wrote for Tru-
man specifically advising the President of potential constitutional
minefields if the matter spilled into the courts.19 Yet Truman's
military advisors, including Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett,
made a firm case that stoppage of steel production would directly
endanger troops in Korea. The President, a former Captain in the
army himself, took this advice with dead seriousness. Recalled
Kayle: "He didn't go by the polls. He used to say, 'What would
Moses have done if he had taken a poll (before handing down the
Ten Commandments)?"'
20
Ken Hechler, a Truman scholar and past recipient of the Harry
S. Truman Public Service Award, emphasized that President
Truman was well schooled in the history of Presidential power.
He had developed a consistent theory in this domain-which came
into play when he ordered the dropping of bombs on Japan to end
World War II; fired General MacArthur; ordered the desegrega-
tion of the armed forces; and sent troops into Korea. That theory
was: Don't wait for Congress to act during times of emergency, or
17. See TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEO INTERVIEW BETWEEN PROFESSOR KEN GORMLEY AND
CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, OCTOBER 30, 2002, 41 DUQ.L.REv 681 (2003).
18. Id.
19. PROCEEDINGS at 689-690 (remarks of Milton Kayle).
20. Id. at 690.
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such inaction will jeopardize the nation and undercut the Presi-
dency.21
"On his tenth birthday," recounted Hechler, " President Truman
received from his mother a four-volume work entitled Great Men
and Famous Women. He read every word of those books ...." Con-
cluded Hechler: "He never agonized over any of his presidential
decisions. He was eager to get out of a crisis and come to a conclu-
sion." "
Although President Truman was aware that he could invoke the
Taft-Hartley Act that had been recently adopted (over his veto) by
Congress, to impose an 80-day cooling off period, he felt the Act
was too cumbersome and time-consuming.23 Asked if Truman was
stubborn and bull-headed, as many pundits described him at the
time, Hechler replied: "Well, I would use the word 'principled,'
rather than stubborn and bull-headed.,
24
David Feller, one of the principal lawyers for the Steelworkers
Union (who passed away in February at age 87, and to whom this
special symposium issue is dedicated), believed that the Supreme
Court's "premature" intervention thwarted the President's plan to
prod the parties to work out their differences. According to Feller,
after Judge David Pine surprised court-watchers by setting aside
the seizure and declaring it unconstitutional, President Truman
called the parties together at the White House and played a
shrewd poker hand. He declared: "The Secretary of Commerce is
about to make some changes. Neither party is going to like what
we are going to do ...." With this warning dangling over their
heads, the steel companies and unions went back to the negotiat-
ing table prepared to hash out a deal."
Feller recalled sitting in the CIO offices at Jackson Place, and
receiving instructions from Arthur Goldberg: "Start drafting; we're
going to settle." Just as the finishing touches were being put on
the documents, however, Feller received a call from Goldberg at
the White House. He blurted out: "Well, the Supreme Court has
stopped it. It's over.,
26
21. PROCEEDINGS at 691 (remarks of Ken Hechler).
22. Id. at 692.
23. PROCEEDINGS at 688-689 (remarks of Milton Kayle).
24. PROCEEDINGS at 693 (remarks of Ken Hechler).
25. PROCEEDINGS at 695-696 (remarks of David Feller).
26. Id. at 696.
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According to Feller: "This was the case that the Supreme Court
should not have taken.,
27
Stanley Temko, who filed the case in the Supreme Court on be-
half of U.S. Steel, recalled that Attorney General Holmes
Baldridge made sweeping arguments in favor of unlimited Presi-
dential power in the lower courts, sinking the government's posi-
tion. Baldridge's argument, which alarmed the judges and en-
raged the public, was that the only way to stop a runaway Presi-
dent was through "impeachment or the ballot box," rather than
through the courts.28
President Truman never stood a chance, most observers felt,
once the case was taken by the Supreme Court. The steel compa-
nies had retained as their lawyer John W. Davis, the legendary
white-haired Supreme Court advocate who had run for President
in 1924, and was treated with reverence by the Justices; he was
barely interrupted during his entire argument. 9 On the other
hand, the Truman Administration's Justice Department - which
was in between Attorneys General because of a petty scandal -
was represented by Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman, who was
prepared with questions when he stood up at the wooden lectern
to present the President's case."° Perlman's basic argument was,
in effect: "This is wartime, the President can do almost anything
he wants as part of his emergency powers." He sought to cobble
together an argument by aggregating powers contained in Article
II of the Constitution - namely, the provision that states "The ex-
ecutive power shall be vested in the President;" and "he shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed;" and the President "shall
be Commander in Chief of the army and navy."3 But that patch-
work argument did little to sway the majority of Justices.
Two weeks later, David Feller was seated in the courtroom
when the Supreme Court handed down its opinion. Arthur Gold-
berg leaned over to Feller and whispered: "Get up and call Phil
Murray" (head of the Steelworkers Union). Feller had a secretary
holding open a public pay phone in the lobby. He placed the call;
Murray was stunned: Seven minutes later, before the last Justice
had finished reading his opinion in the Supreme Court, before the
Steelworkers had gone on strike, shutting down the nation's steel
27. Id.
28. PROCEEDINGS at 697 (remarks of Stanley Temko).
29. PROCEEDINGS at 701 (remarks of David Feller).
30. REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 185-86
31. WESTIN, supra note 1, at 101-109.
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mills for fifty-four days-precisely the outcome that President
Truman had struggled to prevent.32
Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority of the Court, issued
what amounted to a stinging rebuke of the President. He stated:
"Even though 'theater of war' be an expanding concept, we cannot
with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Com-
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as
such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor
disputes from stopping production."33  Such domestic matters,
Black concluded, lay squarely within the domain of Congress.
The most enduring opinion, however, proved to be the concur-
rence of Justice Robert Jackson. A powerful intellectual who did
not much care for the likes of Harry Truman, Jackson was a
judge's judge. He was his own man. Jackson had headed the tri-
als at Nuremberg; he had been mentioned as a candidate for
President; he was a towering figure as Solicitor General and at-
torney general under FDR,34 and he wasn't particularly thrilled
that Truman had passed him up as Chief Justice for crony Fred
Vinson.
But Jackson's opinion is still viewed as a masterpiece-not be-
cause of that personality clash-but because he went to the heart
of the President's power under the Constitution. Professor John
Barrett, who is presently completing a biography of Jackson, ex-
plained that Jackson felt passionately about this "Presidential
powers" issue: He had struggled with it as Attorney General,
when he supported President Roosevelt's seizing of the North
American Aviation plant during World War Two (he concluded
that President Roosevelt had such power primarily because that
company was an exclusive producer for the government, and al-
most amounted to a branch of the Pentagon).35
In eloquent fashion, Jackson laid out three different categories
of Presidential power that created a spectrum within our Consti-
tutional system, which became the legacy of the Steel Seizure de-.• 36
cision.
In the first category, when the President acts pursuant to ex-
press or implied authorization of Congress, his powers are strong-
32. PROCEEDINGS at 701-702 (remarks of David Feller).
33. 343 U.S. at 587.
34. REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 179-180; PROCEEDINGS at 45-48 (remarks of John
Barrett).
35. PROCEEDINGS at 704-707 (remarks of John Barrett).
36. 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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est. He is acting based upon whatever powers he possesses (in-
herently) in the Constitution, plus whatever power Congress is
allowed to delegate him. In the second category, when the Presi-
dent acts where Congress has neither granted nor denied author-
ity, he is in a middle ground. He must rely on his own powers in
the Constitution; but there is a "zone of twilight" in which he and
Congress can comfortably co-exist. In the third category, where
the President acts in a manner incompatible with the express or
implied will of Congress, his power is at lowest ebb. He can rely
only on his own powers, minus the Constitution's powers of Con-
gress. Here, the "equilibrium" of the government's system of sepa-
ration of powers is at stake. Thus, the courts must be leery when
they venture into this third zone of danger."
In this case, Justice Jackson concluded, President Truman was
in the third, weakest category. The Constitution did not specifi-
cally or even implicitly authorize him to seize private property on
U.S. soil. Nor had Congress given him that power - in fact, at the
time Congress debated the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, it specifically
rejected an amendment that would have allowed the President to
seize businesses in times of emergency. The President's powers
were thus at their nadir here.38
Only Chief Justice Vinson, Truman's close friend and poker-
playing partner, and Justices Reed and Minton dissented.39 It was
a decisive loss.
There was no question that the Court's decision in Youngstown
constituted a major blow to Truman, during the waning months of
his Presidency. Truman was especially angry at his appointees,
Justices Clark and Burton, whom he felt had betrayed him. Said
Hechler:"There was a blue smoke around the White House for a
couple of days." Even though Truman accepted the decision, "I
don't think he ever forgave Tom Clark."4
Truman, never one to keep his feelings masked, asked Milton
Kayle to prepare a list of "what was wrong with (the Court's) deci-
sion," on a single piece of paper. President Truman then took that
sheet with him to a dinner hosted by Justice Black at his home (at
which all of the Justices would be present, as a sort of peace-
offering to the President). On that paper Kayle wrote: "The Su-
37. Id. at 635-38.
38. Id. at 640.
39. Id. at 667 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
40. PROCEEDINGS at 704 (remarks of Ken Hechler).
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preme Court substituted its judgment for that of the President as
to the seriousness of the cessation of production of steel at this
time...'
Whether Truman ever delivered that message remains unclear.
It was reported, however, that at the conclusion of dinner he
turned to Justice Black and quipped: "I don't like your law, but
this is mighty good bourbon.
42
Why did the Supreme Court conclude that Harry S. Truman
had overstepped his Constitutional boundaries? And why, even
more curiously, has Truman nonetheless been treated so well in
American history books?
On the first question, the answer boils down to a point made by
Chief Justice Rehnquist in introducing this symposium: By the
time the case reached the Supreme Court, there simply was not a
sense by citizens that the nation was seriously at risk.43
Fighting in Korea had come to a lull during truce talks.
Onlookers in the United States that summer were more concerned
with a baseball season dominated by the New York Yankees and
the Brooklyn Dodgers, than war overseas. There was a sense that
the dire warnings by the military were overblown.44 In fact, that
sense turned out to be accurate: Dr. Maeva Marcus concluded
that Truman in fact received misinformation, particularly from
military advisors including Secretary of Defense Lovett. Secretary
Lovett had warned that any interruption in the production of steel
would put soldiers at risk. Yet the steel strike went on for two
months before it was settled, and it produced no apparent short-
age. Steel was being released for bicycles and domestic luxuries -
there was no noticeable impact. The military warnings, in hind-
sight, were undoubtedly puffed. Stated Marcus: "There seemed to
be plenty of steel on hand, and this became common knowledge...
And so the Court felt, reflecting the public consensus, that it could
reassert the ordinary limits on presidential power, and that is why
it did so.""
Why, then, does Harry S. Truman remain one of the most popu-
lar Presidents in American history, despite the serious misstep in
seizing the steel mills? As Milton Kayle stated: "He wasn't con-
cerned about his legacy." Kayle stated that Truman did what "he
41. PROCEEDINGS at 702 (remarks of Milton Kayle).
42. Id.
43. REHNQUIST INTERVIEW, supra note 17, at 683.
44. NEUSTADT FILM, supra note 7.
45. PROCEEDINGS at 711 (remarks of Maeva Marcus).
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believed was the right thing to do," and history treated him kindly
for that. ,
46
As students and scholars look back with the benefit of 50 years'
worth of hindsight, it is safe to conclude that the Steel Seizure
Case is not about good and bad; it is not about moral absolutes.
Rather, It is about the very difficult process that a nation must go
through during times of crisis, struggling with how much latitude
to give a President as commander-in-chief; how much power to
preserve for Congress; and the courts' role in this precarious jug-
gling act.
The Steel Seizure case, and Justice Jackson's three-part test
dealing with Presidential power, has loomed in the shadows of
every President since Harry Truman. It was cited prominently by
the Supreme Court when it ordered President Nixon to hand over
the Watergate tapes in United States v. Nixon." It was a key case
in deciding that President Ronald Reagan had the power to freeze
assets in the United States and set up a special tribunal to deal
with claims against Iran in the aftermath of the Iran hostage cri-
sis.48 It was a major factor in 1983 when the Court concluded that
Congress could not maintain a legislative veto over the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service and invalidate a decision of the
executive branch which had authorized a deportable alien to re-
main in the United States.49 It was even cited in Clinton v. Jones,
in deciding that a President could be sued civilly while in office.
(If the courts could review the legality of Truman's official conduct
while in office, they could determine the legality of unofficial con-
duct as well.)"°
The Steel Seizure Case serves as a length of cord loosely
wrapped around the President's wrists, ready to tighten itself
around his hands - and around the hands of the entire executive
branch that answers to the chief executive. Yet this only happens
if the courts (and ultimately the American people) determine that
the President has stepped across that fine Constitutional line.
The Steel Seizure Case remains the granddaddy of the cases relat-
ing to Presidential power, in post-September 11th America. As
Judge Abner Mikva explained, it bears direct relevance on the
current issue of President George W. Bush's power to deal with
46. PROCEEDINGS at 715 (remarks of Milton Kayle).
47. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703, 707 (1974).
48. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981).
49. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983).
50. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697 (1997).
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alleged terrorists on American soil, particularly to the extent this
executive action may collide with individual rights of citizens and
resident aliens. Stated Mikva: "The President is dealing with do-
mestic affairs, and he is at low ebb under Justice Jackson's test."
Although the USA Patriot Act has afforded the President consid-
erable authority in this sphere, Mikva noted that the Constitution
still imposes limitations: "The Steel Seizure Case suggests that
the President will be on very tenuous grounds here."51
Professor John Barrett agreed; yet he emphasized that the Su-
preme Court will ultimately view each emergency in its own light.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist had pointed out in introducing the
program: "Had (this case) come up in time of declared war, it
might have come out differently.,
52
Concluded Barrett, "So they (the Justices) will view tomorrow's
situation as they see fit. '"'
As to whether the Steel Seizure Case had any lasting impact on
the legacy of President Truman, Professor David Feller com-
mented: "In one sense, Truman's loss in the Steel Seizure Case
was a product of his best qualities. He laid it on the line, and he
laid it on hard....
At the conclusion of this historic panel, Duquesne University
President Charles Dougherty presented a special citation to Presi-
dent Truman, commemorating the 5 0 th Anniversary of the com-
pletion of his years of public service in the White House. Clifton
Truman Daniel and Dr. Michael Devine accepted the award on
behalf of the Truman Library and the Truman family. Mr. Daniel,
in moving comments, stated that it was worthwhile to debate the
wisdom of his grandfather's decision in the Steel Seizure Case.
Yet he concluded: "My grandfather certainly did know his own
mind...6 And he did what he did out of a sense of justice and out
of a sense of advocacy for all Americans."
51. PROCEEDINGS at 712-713 (remarks of Abner Mikva).
52. REHNQUIST INTERVIEW, supra note 17, at 683.
53. PROCEEDINGS at 713-714 (remarks of John Barrett).
54. PROCEEDINGS at 717 (remarks of David Feller).
55. PROCEEDINGS at 718-719 (remarks of Charles Dougherty).
56. PROCEEDINGS at 720 (remarks of Clifton Truman Daniel).
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The symposium and articles contained in this special issue will
hopefully help to preserve an important piece of 201h-century his-
tory, and provide guidance as future courts and chief executives
and legal scholars seek to discern the parameters of presidential
power in light of President Harry S. Truman's controversial deci-
sion to take over the nation's steel mills act in the historic Steel
Seizure Case.

